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Abstract
This paper analyzes and compares the performance of different delegation
schemes when the central bank has imperfect commitment. A continuum of
loose commitment possibilities is considered ranging from full commitment to
full discretion. The results show that the performance of inflation targeting
improves substantially with higher commitment levels. On the other hand,
the performance of other targeting regimes does not necessarily improve with
the commitment level of the central bank. While it was previously thought
that inflation targeting is inferior to other targeting regimes, the results show
that it can be the best performing regime as long as the commitment level is
not too low. These results may provide a theoretical explanation for the high
popularity of inflation targeting among central banks.
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1 Introduction
The optimal design of monetary institutions and objectives has received con-
siderable attention both from academics and policymakers. Rogoff (1985) showed
that if optimal monetary policy is time-inconsistent and the central bank operates
under full discretion, then the central bank should be delegated objectives which are
different than society’s. More recent results regarding monetary policy (e.g. Clarida
et al. (1999) among many others) have shown that even without an inflation bias
it is still desirable to distort the central bank objectives in order to improve the
short-run response to shocks (so-called stabilization bias).
The literature that has analyzed delegation and the stabilization bias typically
assumed that central banks operate with full discretion. This seems to be, to some
extent, unrealistic. Central banks may have some credibility problems, but assuming
that central banks have no credibility at all seems to be rather extreme. Indeed,
it is not clear that central banks lack commitment. Blinder (1998) stated that
commitment problems are dealt with by ”norms of behavior” (Blinder, 1998 p. 49)”.
Obviously if one considers that central banks have full commitment then there is no
role for delegation. However, there is a role for delegation in a setting where there is
a continuum of loose commitment possibilities ranging from full commitment to full
discretion. In such setting, the central bank has partial commitment (or imperfect
credibility to maintain promises). These loose commitment settings are modeled as
in Roberds (1987), Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), and Debortoli and Nunes
(2007, 2008a).
In this paper, I assume that the objectives of the central bank cannot be changed,
unlike Debortoli and Nunes (2008a). Thus, society can perfectly commit to a del-
2
egation scheme.1 Once central bank’s objectives are set, instead of assuming that
the central bank behaves with full discretion, I assume an imperfect commitment
setting. In this context, the paper examines several delegation schemes and shows
how their performance changes with the commitment level of the central bank.
An optimal precommitment policy (the best possible policy under full commit-
ment) imparts inertia to policy even when expectations are purely forward-looking.
A central bank operating under full discretion will fail to introduce inertia. Because
of this feature, delegation schemes often introduce an endogenous state-variable in
the central bank objective function, which imparts inertia into a monetary policy
even under full discretion. However, if the central bank has a modest degree of
commitment it already imparts inertia into the system. In such a case, delegation
schemes which introduce an endogenous state-variable may impart an excessive and
detrimental amount of inertia. Due to this reason, the properties of the economy
are likely to change substantially with intermediate degrees of commitment relative
to the case of full discretion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and differ-
ent delegation schemes. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 examines
alternative scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The analysis is based on a simple New Keynesian model. The New Keynesian
Phillips curve (NKPC) is a reduced form approximation of the relationship between
inflation and output in an economy with monopolistic competition and staggered
1For another recent analysis with objective changes see Korinek and Stiglitz (2008).
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price setting.2 Throughout the paper, I assume a perfect information environment.3
Following Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), I consider the possibility that the Phillips curve
may also include a backward-looking term. The hybrid Phillips curve takes the form
pit = κxt + αβEtpit+1 + (1− α)βpit−1 + ut (1)
where pit denotes price inflation and xt = yt − ynt measures the output-gap, i.e. the
difference between current output (yt) and the output level that would prevail under
flexible prices (ynt ). The natural output level (y
n
t ) follows an AR(1) process given
by
ynt = ρyy
n
t−1 + ζ
y
t 0 ≤ ρy < 1 (2)
where ζyt is a mean-zero innovation with standard deviation σy. The cost-push shock
ut follows an AR(1) process given by
ut = ρuut−1 + ζut 0 ≤ ρu < 1 (3)
where ζut is a mean-zero innovation with standard deviation σu. As is standard in
the optimal monetary policy literature, it is assumed that the central bank controls
inflation and the output-gap directly.4 The welfare loss function of society is assumed
to take the form
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
−1
2
(pi2t + ωxt
2)
]
(4)
A few remarks about equation (4) are in order. First, the assumption of a zero
inflation target is merely a convenient normalization. Second, such a loss function
2The theoretical framework underlying such relationship is described for instance in Yun (1996),
Woodford (2003a) and Gal´ı (2008).
3For two very interesting discussions of optimal monetary policy with imperfect information see
Mertens (2007) and Kim and Henderson (2005).
4The interest rate it required to implement the desired inflation level can be obtained from the
demand side of the economy, not modeled here.
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can under some circumstances be derived as an approximation to the utility function
of a representative consumer in the case of a pure forward-looking NKPC. I will con-
sider both a pure forward-looking and a hybrid NKPC. Most studies on delegation
have assumed such a loss function even under inflation persistence. To allow com-
parability of results, I follow the same approach, and analyze how targeting regimes
are affected by the introduction of imperfect commitment. Finally, in line with the
related literature, I assume an output-gap target of zero. The potential gains from
delegating targeting regimes are only due to an improved stabilization bias in re-
sponse to shocks. Unlike in Rogoff (1985), the potential gains from delegation do
not accrue from correcting the inflation bias. Also, an output-gap target of zero
does not introduce an incentive for monetary surprises in steady-state. In this case,
the optimal precommitment policy and the non-optimal timeless perspective policy
coincide.5
2.1 Loose commitment and imperfect credibility
Imperfect credibility or loose commitment is modeled as in Roberds (1987).
Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) generalized Roberds (1987) results to linear
quadratic settings and provided a very interesting application to monetary policy.
Debortoli and Nunes (2007) provided proofs and extended the results to general
dynamic-programming problems, and showed an application to fiscal policy. The
central bank is assumed to be able to make a policy plan regarding future actions.
However, in future periods previous promises may either be fulfilled or reneged
according to an exogenous stochastic probability. The central bank optimization
problem is analogous to the firm problem facing an exogenous Calvo probability
5Currie and Levine (1993), Marcet and Marimon (1998) and Woodford (2003b) provide a de-
tailed discussion of this topic.
5
of being able to change prices.6 This allows for tractability of the model, and still
allows to analyze optimal policy in such settings. Both the private sector, and the
central bank itself know that the policy plan is only expected to last for some periods
(not known with certainty). When the policy plan breaks, a reoptimization occurs
and a new plan is implemented. The parameter defining the expected duration of a
plan determines the commitment level of the central bank. At one extreme, the plan
is never kept and one is back to the full discretion solution. At the other extreme,
the plan is known to be effective forever and one is back to the full commitment
setup.
Such a setting characterizes situations when policymakers can guarantee their
own promises but cannot influence the behavior of their successors, who are ex-
pected to formulate a new policy plan. Such situations are common given governor
appointments in central banks and staff turnover. Moreover the same policymakers
may, under some exogenous circumstances, reformulate and reoptimize their plans.
If plans are expected to last for (T ) periods with an i.i.d. exogenous probability
(q) to be broken at any point in time, then the problem can be formulated as:7
V (pit−1, ut) = max{pit,xt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βq)t {−1
2
[
pi2t + ωx
2
t
]
+ β(1− q)EtV (pit, ut+1)} (5)
s.t. pit = κyt + (1− α)βpit−1 + βαqEtpit+1 + βα (1− q)EtΨ(pit, ut+1) + ut
ut = ρuut−1 + ζut ∀t = 0, 1, ....
Since agents anticipate that next period promises may be either reneged or kept,
forward-looking expectations consist of two components. The term Etpit+1 refers to
the expected inflation rate if no default occurs. The term EtΨ(pit, ut+1) refers to the
6The central bank problem is more complex because its constraints depend on future actions.
7More precisely, T = 11−q .
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expected inflation rate if previous plans are not carried out. The inflation rate under
default Ψ(pit, ut+1) does not depend on any previous plans, and is a function of the
state-variables (last-period inflation and the contemporaneous cost-push shock).8
Under imperfect credibility, the objective function is also slightly changed. The
central bank can make a plan for all future variables if default does not occur. But
if default does occur, the current central bank anticipates the policies and the value
function (V ) that is implemented from that node onwards.
The following equilibrium definition is employed:
Definition 1 A Markov Perfect Equilibrium solution of problem (5) must satisfy
the following:
1. Given V and Ψ, the sequence {pit, xt}∞t=0 maximizes problem (5).
2. The value function V is the maximum of problem (5).
3. Define ψ(pit−1, ut, λt−1) to be the optimal policy function of inflation solving
problem (5), where {λt}∞t=0 is the sequence of lagrange-multipliers associated
with the NKPC constraints. Then Ψ(pit−1, ut) = ψ(pit−1, ut, 0).
We refer to a Markov Perfect Equilibrium, because Ψ only depends on the state
variables (pit−1, ut). The first part of the definition states that, given the anticipated
continuation value (V ) and private sector beliefs about the default policy (Ψ), the
central bank is maximizing. The second part imposes that, when a default occurs,
the central bank makes a new plan that is optimal attaining the maximum welfare
value (V ).9 The final part requires private sector beliefs about the default policy
8If α = 1, then the cost-push shock is the only state-variable.
9If central bank’s objectives before and after defaulting do not coincide, then the second part
of the definition should not hold. This corresponds to a case with alternating regimes or with
political disagreement, which has been addressed in Debortoli and Nunes (2008a,b).
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to be correct and consistent with the optimal policy function implemented in such
case. As Marcet and Marimon (1998) discuss, previous promises are summarized
by the last-period lagrange-multiplier (λt−1). In case of default, λt−1 is reset to zero
since previous promises are abandoned. Further details on this type of formulation
can be found in Debortoli and Nunes (2007).
2.2 Delegation schemes
Delegation schemes are modeled as a set of incentive mechanisms for central
banks, which induce a behavior that aims at attaining various policy goals. (e.g.
Rogoff (1985), Walsh (1995), Svensson (1997)). These set of incentives are also
known as targeting regimes. The targeting regimes considered are understood to be
flexible, i.e. the central bank may optimally let variables be off target.
In related work, Debortoli and Nunes (2008a) consider that the imperfect credi-
bility in the economy relates to changing monetary policy objectives. In this work,
I consider that there is perfect credibility when implementing the targeting regime,
however the central bank itself has imperfect credibility about committing to future
policy actions. Hence, it is always assumed that society can fully commit to an
institutional setup. This feature is subject to the McCallum (1995) critique of mon-
etary delegation theories, since society itself would like to take control of policy once
expectations are set. This paper only discusses targeting regimes where the relevant
parameters (weights and targets) are constrained to be constant. As Beetsma and
Jensen (1999) argue, a monetary institutional setup with characteristics that do not
change with the business cycle is less subject to the McCallum (1995) critique.10 In
addition, as Walsh (2003a) describes, the temptation to renege on a targeting regime
10Time-inconsistency issues could be hard to monitor if it was institutionally allowed to change
the loss function frequently according to the evolution of the economy.
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may be overcome due to the high embarrassment costs of overriding the publicly
known targeting regime and the laws that enforce it. In this sense, it may be easy
to commit to a targeting regime if it is explicitly and publicly adopted and enforced
through a clear mandate.
The optimal benchmark for the delegation schemes is the policy that a central
bank with full commitment would implement when minimizing the social welfare
function. We denote this best possible scenario as the ”optimal precommitment
policy”. As it is well known, in response to cost-push shocks the optimal precom-
mitment policy implies a promise of a prolonged recession which induces a deflation.
The future deflation makes the current inflation to be dampened due to an expec-
tations effect. The optimal policy is also inertial since the recession is less costly if
it is small and prolonged rather than drastic and short-lived.
The first targeting regime considered is inflation targeting (IT), which was pro-
posed in different forms, for instance, by Rogoff (1985) and Svensson (1997). The
period loss function under IT is:
UIT = −1
2
(pi2t + ωITx
2
t ) (6)
It is well know that there are gains from IT even if the output-gap target is zero.
These gains accrue due to a more efficient response to cost-push shocks. Previous
studies found that delegating an IT regime when the central bank has full discretion
produces only limited welfare gains. Assigning ωIT ≤ ω, makes the central bank
correct the impulse response function dampening more strongly inflation in the
current and future periods. However, an inflation targeting regime fails to produce
a deflation or to impart inertia into policy.
Walsh (2003b) has proposed a speed limit targeting regime (SLT). In this case,
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the period loss function is given by:
USLT = −1
2
(pi2t + ωSLT (xt − xt−1)2) (7)
Walsh showed that in a full discretion environment a speed limit policy manages
to induce persistence in policy. The lagged output-gap term induces history de-
pendence, as in the optimal precommitment policy. In face of a positive cost-push
shock, inflation rises and the output-gap becomes negative. After the impact re-
sponse, the output-gap remains negative, because large changes in the output-gap
carry a cost to the central bank. The persistent recession is associated with defla-
tionary pressures. Therefore, even inflation in the initial period is well anchored due
to expectations of low future inflation.
Jensen (2002) has proposed nominal income growth targeting (NIGT). The pe-
riod loss function assigned to the central bank is given by:
UNIGT = −1
2
(ωx2t + ωNIGT (pit + yt − yt−1)2) (8)
This regime also induces inertia and history dependence into the system mimicking
quite well the optimal precommitment policy. After the initial rise in inflation and
drop in output, the recession is somewhat persistent to keep nominal income at
target. Since the central bank would like to bring output back to steady state,
output grows sluggishly. In order to attenuate the increase in nominal income the
central bank has the incentive to keep future inflation quite low. In summary, the
optimal precommitment patterns of future low inflation and a persistent recession
are insured.
The optimal precommitment policy leaves the output-gap and inflation un-
changed in response to shocks in the natural output level.11 The NIGT regime
11That is to say, output responds one-to-one to natural-output leaving the output-gap unchanged.
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features an inefficient response to these type of shocks; the central bank fails to sta-
bilize the output-gap completely as this conflicts with stabilizing nominal income.
Vestin (2006) describes in detail the benefits of a price-level targeting regime
(PT).
UPT = −1
2
(p2t + ωPTx
2
t ) (9)
After the initial rise in inflation and the price level, the central bank immediately
entails a deflation to bring the price level back to target. In doing so, inflation in
the first period is well anchored due to expectations of low future prices.
I have chosen these four targeting regimes because they have received consider-
able attention in the literature. For instance, Walsh (2003b) has analyzed the same
targeting regimes, but considered only a full discretion setup. Also, for reasons dis-
cussed previously, I am focusing on delegation schemes with constant parameters.
3 Main Results
The calibration is set in table 1. The model is interpreted as being quarterly
and the discount factor is set at 0.99. With a discount factor close to one the
deviation from the strict natural-rate hypothesis is negligible. The elasticity of
current inflation with respect to the output gap is set at 0.1. This value is in line
with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) for annualized inflation rates. The specific
importance of forward-looking expectations in the NKPC is highly controversial. I
consider an intermediate position and set α = 0.5. In the sensitivity analysis, other
values of α are examined. All the remaining parameters are set in accordance with
the baseline calibrations of Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003b).
The properties and performance of targeting regimes when the central bank has
imperfect commitment have not been studied before, and I carry out such analysis in
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Table 1: Calibration
β ω κ α ρu ζu ρy ζy
0.99 0.25 0.1 0.5 0 0.015 0.97 0.005
this section. Figure (1) plots the welfare achieved by society when the stabilization
of specific objectives is delegated to the central bank.12 The upper panel plots the
relative change in loss with respect to the optimal precommitment policy.13 The
middle panel follows Jensen (2002) and plots the permanent output-gap yielding
the same absolute change in loss.14 Each line corresponds to a different targeting
regime. The welfare achieved by society depends on the expected commitment
duration (T ), which is plotted in the horizontal axis. When (T = 1) the usual
full discretion results are recovered, and when (T = ∞) the central bank has full
commitment. The lower panel plots the optimal weights, which depend on the
expected commitment duration.
When the central bank acts with full discretion, IT is the worst performing
targeting regime with a relative loss of 17%. SLT performs the best, followed by
NIGT and PT. However, the results change substantially if one considers that the
promises of the central bank are expected to last for some periods. If the central bank
has partial commitment, the welfare attained by IT starts to improve drastically.
Even if the expected commitment duration is relatively low, the welfare attained
by society under IT becomes very close to the welfare obtained with the optimal
12Unconditional welfare was computed as in Jensen (2002). The results are robust if one considers
welfare conditional on the initial state-vector being on steady-state. A numerical package that
solves for optimal policy with loose commitment settings is documented and provided in Debortoli
et al. (2008). The appendix describes the numerical algorithm and the first-order-conditions.
13That is to say, (L¦¦ − LOPP )/LOPP , where LOPP is the optimal precommitment policy loss,
and L¦¦ is the loss of a specific targeting regime for a given T .
14In other words, the middle panel plots c such that (LOPP − L¦¦) = 12 11−βω( c100 )2.
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precommitment policy. In the extreme case in which the central bank has full
commitment, IT attains the highest possible welfare. In such a case, it is optimal
to make the objectives of the central bank and society to coincide, ωIT = ω.
While the welfare attained by IT increases with the expected commitment du-
ration, other targeting regimes do not display a similar pattern. The reason is the
following. If the central bank has an improved commitment technology, then it will
use it to achieve its assigned objectives regardless of society’s original objectives. If
society’s and central bank objectives coincide or are similar, an enhanced commit-
ment will improve both central bank’s welfare and society’s. This is precisely the
case of IT. In the other delegation schemes, society’s and central bank’s objectives
do not coincide. Thus, an improved credibility leads the central bank to maximize
its delegated objectives, which may not necessarily improve society’s welfare. For in-
stance, in figure (1) one can observe that if society wants to delegate a PT regime to
its central bank, then society’s welfare is actually higher if the expected commitment
duration of central bank’s promises is 1 rather than 10 quarters.
To the best of my knowledge no central bank is officially pursuing SLT, NIGT or
PT.15 In recent years, several countries have adopted IT. Since several papers had
identified targeting regimes that outperform IT, this empirical observation is hard
to justify. The present results may provide a rationale for this empirical evidence.
If the central bank faces a credibility problem that is not too severe, then IT seems
to be the best performing regime. Despite having different weights potentially, IT
and society’s objectives coincide, and hence a gain in terms of expected commitment
duration of the central bank’s promises is translated into improved society’s welfare.
15Some central banks may de facto but not de jure pursue a targeting regime. However, identi-
fying such cases is difficult and subject to interpretation. The Bank of Canada has been heavily
discussing PT, but has not officially adopted it. In the 1930’s the Sveriges Bank adopted PT but
than abandoned it.
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Another observation is that if society delegates objectives which dramatically
differ from the original ones, then the central bank should not try to improve its
commitment and credibility over time. In case it does so, these ”optimal” policy
efforts could very well reduce society’s welfare. For instance, consider two economies:
in economy A the central bank is incompetent and operates under (T = 1), in
economy B, the central bank due to a better communication strategy or enhanced
accountability achieves a higher expected commitment duration, say (T = 10).16
The welfare of society when implementing a SLT, NIGT or PT regime is higher
in the economy where the central bank is incompetent. This effect can be rather
perversive, leading central banks to justify poor performance.
3.1 Inflation Targeting
The first column of figure (2) plots the IT policy if the central bank acts with
discretion in every period. In this case, the economy never experiences a recession
and a deflation because such promises are not time-consistent. To identify the effects
of increasing the expected commitment duration, figure (2) plots the expected path
of the impulse response functions (IRF) when T = 20. The central bank uses its
partial commitment to announce a future recession and a deflation. Such promises
will not always be kept. The private sector and the central bank itself anticipate
future defaults, and hence central bank credibility is imperfect. The middle column
of figure (2) plots the IRF that occurs if, by chance, the central bank would never
default, and the effect of a default in period 4. If past promises are not kept, the
prolonged recession is abandoned and the output-gap is brought closer to target.
The last column of figure (2) displays the optimal precommitment policy, and
16Mishkin (2008) provides an interesting discussion on central bank commitment and communi-
cation.
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Figure 1: Welfare - Baseline Calibration
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Note: In all panels, the horizontal axis refers to expected commitment duration (T).
For each targeting regime with optimally chosen weights, the upper panel plots the
society’s loss relative to the optimal precommitment policy, i.e. (L¦¦−LOPP )/LOPP .
The optimal policy precommitment policy loss (LOPP ) was found to be -2.9490
(×100). The middle panel follows Jensen (2002) and plots the permanent output-
gap yielding an equivalent change in loss, i.e. it plots c such that (LOPP − L¦¦) =
1
2
1
1−βω(
c
100
)2. The lower panel plots the optimal weights.
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the optimal delegation regimes if the central bank acts with full discretion or faces
an expected commitment duration of 20 periods. If the central bank has more com-
mitment, then the delegated policy tracks more closely the optimal precommitment
policy. Consequently, society’s welfare improves when the central bank’s expected
commitment duration increases.
The optimal delegated weight ωIT increases with T , and if T =∞ then ωIT = ω.
As the central bank gains more commitment the positive effects of distorting the
central bank objectives diminish.
3.2 Speed Limit Targeting
Figure (3) plots the IRF for the SLT case. The first column shows that the
ability to make and keep promises induces the central bank to implement a deeper
recession. The recession is still persistent in order to avoid costs in terms of output-
gap growth, but inflation is reduced at a faster pace. The middle column shows that
if the central bank would default, then the recession would be eased.
The optimal delegated speed limit policy when T = 1 tracks quite well the
optimal precommitment policy. However, if the central bank is more competent,
then the optimal delegated speed limit policy does not match as closely what society
would desire. As a consequence, society’s welfare would be higher if the central bank
would be less competent.
The optimal delegated weight (ωSLT ) when T = 1 is smaller than when T > 1.
Since the central bank with more commitment promises more prolonged recessions,
society partially offsets this effect by reducing ωSLT .
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Figure 2: Inflation Targeting - IRF - Baseline
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Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-
push shock under IT and the baseline calibration. The IRFs plotted correspond to
three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20,∞} for wIT = 0.25.
When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of ”default” or ”no
default”. The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle
column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where
the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank
keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column
plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal
delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}.
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Figure 3: Speed Limit Targeting - IRF - Baseline
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Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-
push shock under SL and the baseline calibration. The IRFs plotted correspond to
three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20,∞} for wSL = 0.25.
When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of ”default” or ”no
default”. The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle
column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where
the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank
keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column
plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal
delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}.
18
3.3 Nominal Income Growth Targeting
Figure (4) plots the IRF for the NIGT case. If the central bank has the ability to
keep previous promises, then it realizes that by promising a more prolonged recession
it can affect more efficiently current inflation. Nominal income growth is closer to
zero, because inflation is lower and income does not grow faster.
If the central bank would default on its past promises then output would be
increased towards target, which would increase inflation. For the central bank,
the benefits of increasing output outweighs the costs of higher nominal income.
The last column in the figure shows the policy implemented by the central bank
when the delegation is chosen optimally with T = 1 or T = 20. The increased
commitment ability of the central bank induces more inertia than what is optimal.
As a consequence, in the initial periods output is higher than optimal, and in later
periods it is lower than optimal. Since output is too low in later periods, the deflation
is too strong.
The optimal delegated weight ωNIGT is lower when T is higher. As society
anticipates a stronger response of output when the central bank is more competent,
society delegates objectives that give more importance to output (lower ωNIGT ).
3.4 Price Level Targeting
The IRF under PT are plotted in Figure (5). The first column shows that, once
again, when the central bank has the ability to make a commitment plan, it promises
a more prolonged recession. The central bank realizes that the current price level
can be further controlled if future inflation is expected to be low. If the central bank
would default on its promises then the recession would immediately become milder
and the reduction in prices would be slower (displayed in the middle column).
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Figure 4: Nominal Income Growth Targeting - IRF - Baseline
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Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-push
shock under NIGT and the baseline calibration. The IRFs plotted correspond to
three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20,∞} for wNIGT = 0.25.
When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of ”default” or ”no
default”. The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle
column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where
the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank
keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column
plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal
delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}.
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The final column in figure (5) displays the optimal delegated policies for different
commitment levels. The extra inertia induced by commitment is once again not an
advantage to society. On impact the negative output-gap response is too moderate,
and then due to inertia the recession becomes too strong. As a counterpart, inflation
becomes too low after some periods inducing a non-optimal cost of a disinflation.
Since extra commitment makes the central bank respond more strongly on output,
it is not surprising that, for instance, ωPT (T = 20) is higher than ωPT (T = 1).
4 Sensitivity Analysis
I examined several alternative scenarios to test the robustness of the results,
and the results did not change qualitatively. In one scenario, the persistence of the
cost-push shock (ρu) was increased to 0.3. Then, the social weight on output-gap
stabilization (ω) was set to be the double or half of the baseline value. The most
interesting findings relate to the parameter governing the importance of forward-
looking behavior (α). Figure (6) presents the welfare results for the pure forward-
looking NKPC; the IRFs for each targeting regime are available in the appendix.
I found that when the economy is completely forward-looking most of the results
remain unchanged. The performance of inflation targeting dramatically improves
with the level of commitment, and for reasonable levels of intermediate commitment
IT becomes the best performing delegation scheme.
One difference that occurs is that welfare with SLT and NIGT can also be in-
creasing with the level of commitment. The intuition of this result is the following.
As Jensen (2002) and Walsh (2003b) point out, both of these delegation schemes
do not impart enough inertia into policy.17 Even with optimally chosen weights,
17Walsh (2003b) discusses this issue in detail. These patterns can also be observed in the last
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Figure 5: Price Level Targeting - IRF - Baseline
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Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-
push shock under PT and the baseline calibration. The IRFs plotted correspond
to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20,∞} for wPT = 0.25.
When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of ”default” or ”no
default”. The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories. The middle
column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the history where
the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the central bank
keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The third column
plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for the optimal
delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}.
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Figure 6: Welfare - Pure Forward-Looking Case
12345678910 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Full−Comm.
0
5
10
15
20
Expected Commitment Duration (T)
Lo
ss
 %
 o
f F
ul
l C
om
.
12345678910 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Full−Comm.
0
0.5
1
1.5
Expected Commitment Duration (T)
Pe
rm
an
en
t O
ut
pu
t−
ga
p 
%
12345678910 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Full−Comm.
0
1
2
3
Expected Commitment Duration (T)
O
pt
im
al
 W
ei
gh
ts
 
 
IT SL NIGT PT
Note: In all panels, the horizontal axis refers to expected commitment duration (T).
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the response of output is initially too strong and fades out too quickly. But when
the central bank has more commitment, then it imparts more inertia into policy.
Obviously, the central bank is doing this in order to maximize its assigned objectives
instead of society’s. But society finds it very useful that the central bank reacts in
that way because it imparts more inertia into policy and allows society to achieve a
higher welfare. These results contradict the ones for the benchmark calibration, in
which the economy already has a high degree of backward-looking behavior. In the
benchmark case, having more commitment increases the level of policy inertia even
further into levels that make it hard to mimic the optimal precommitment policy.
The behavior of price level targeting is slightly different. Vestin (2006) showed
that for the pure forward-looking NKPC price level targeting can actually mimic
the optimal precommitment policy. In that case, the amount of inertia in the cen-
tral bank policy under full discretion is already optimal. Increasing inertia due to
commitment worsens welfare.
5 Conclusions
Previous analysis of monetary policy delegation and institutional design had
assumed that the central bank operates under full discretion (e.g. Clarida et al.
(1999), Jensen (2002), Walsh (2003b), Vestin (2006)). Such an assumption is rather
restrictive. In practice, central bank’s credibility or commitment may be imperfect
but not necessarily inexistent.
Insofar as the central bank is partially credible, society can still be better-off
by delegating objectives to the central bank. However, the performance of a dele-
gation scheme will depend on whether the central bank operates with intermediate
column of the IRF figures displayed in the appendix.
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commitment or full discretion. This paper examined how delegation schemes mit-
igate the stabilization bias for a continuum of commitment levels that range from
full discretion to full commitment. The imperfect credibility or loose commitment
settings were modeled as in Roberds (1987), Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007),
and Debortoli and Nunes (2007).
The results showed that while the performance of inflation targeting improved
with the level of commitment, the same pattern did not always occur for the other
delegation schemes considered. The intuition is that in a standard optimization
problem, more commitment increases the level of welfare. The central bank’s welfare
function under inflation targeting is similar and possibly coincides with the social
welfare function. Hence, an improved level of commitment is translated into higher
levels of welfare to society. In contrast, other delegation schemes considered endow
the central bank with objectives which are very different from society’s. Regardless
of society’s objectives, the central bank would use its enhanced commitment to
pursue the objectives that it was assigned to accomplish. Therefore, when society’s
and central bank objectives differ, the enhanced commitment policies of the central
bank are not necessarily beneficial to society.
These results suggest that delegating objectives to the central bank that differ
substantially from the society’s objectives may be less beneficial than previously
thought. In addition, doing so could potentially deter the central bank from be-
having competently and trying to improve its credibility. In fact, for the baseline
calibration and all delegation schemes except inflation targeting, an economy with
an incompetent central bank can be better off than an economy with a competent
one. It was also found that, for plausible levels of commitment, inflation targeting
can become the best performing regime. If the commitment of the central bank is
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expected to last more than 10 quarters, then society’s welfare under inflation target-
ing is the highest. In that sense, this paper may provide a rationale for why central
banks have increasingly adopted inflation targeting. In previous research, the theo-
retical evidence of inflation targeting as a relatively inefficient targeting regime could
not account for the widespread practice and high popularity of inflation targeting
among central banks.
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A Appendix
A.1 IRFs - pure forward-looking NKPC
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Figure 7: Inflation Targeting - IRF - α = 1
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Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-push
shock under IT and the baseline calibration except that α = 1. The IRFs plotted
correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20,∞} for
wIT = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of
”default” or ”no default”. The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories.
The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the
history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the
central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The
third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for
the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}.
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Figure 8: Speed Limit Targeting - IRF - α = 1
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Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-push
shock under SL and the baseline calibration except that α = 1. The IRFs plotted
correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20,∞} for
wSL = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of
”default” or ”no default”. The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories.
The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the
history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the
central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The
third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for
the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}.
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Figure 9: Nominal Income Growth Targeting - IRF - α = 1
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Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-push
shock under NIGT and the baseline calibration except that α = 1. The IRFs plotted
correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20,∞} for
wNIGT = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of
”default” or ”no default”. The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories.
The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the
history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the
central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The
third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for
the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}.
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Figure 10: Price Level Targeting - IRF - α = 1
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Note: The first column plots the IRF for a positive one standard deviation cost-push
shock under PT and the baseline calibration except that α = 1. The IRFs plotted
correspond to three levels of commitment of the central bank, T ∈ {0, 20,∞} for
wPT = 0.25. When T = 20, the IRF is dependent on the particular realization of
”default” or ”no default”. The expected IRF is computed by averaging 1000 histories.
The middle column plots two particular histories. The first IRF corresponds to the
history where the central bank always kept past promises. In the second history, the
central bank keeps past promises until period 4 and defaults always thereafter. The
third column plots the IRF for the optimal precommitment policy, and the IRF for
the optimal delegation when T ∈ {0, 20}.
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A.2 Numerical algorithm solving loose commitment prob-
lems
The policy functions of certain variables, in case of default, appear in the con-
straints of the problem. In addition, the future value functions also appear explicitly
in the problem. Following Debortoli and Nunes (2007), I used envelope results for
the derivative of the value function. The policy functions must be guessed before
solving the problem. The computations in the paper used the following iterative
procedure:
1. Guess ΓDt = Cst, where Γ
D
t is the vector of policy functions under default
that appear in the problem, C is the guess matrix, and st is the vector of
state variables. Since the problem is linear quadratic, the policy functions are
linear.
2. Given the guess, solve the problem with a rational expectations solution algo-
rithm. I used the Uhlig (1999) toolkit.
3. Update the guess. From the results of Debortoli and Nunes (2007) the policy
functions under commitment and default coincide, but the last-period lagrange
multiplier associated with forward-looking constraints are set to zero.
4. If the solution and guess coincide stop, otherwise go back to step 1.18
I first solved the full commitment problem, and then used an homothopy to solve
the loose commitment problems until full discretion. This procedure guarantees that
18Debortoli and Nunes (2007) proposed a global solution method with one fix point problem.
The problem in this paper is simpler since it is linear quadratic, and can be efficiently solved relying
on two fix points (one fix point in the default policies guess, and a second fix point in the rational
expectations solution). An iterative procedure for the full discretion case is available in Dennis
(2007).
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the initial guess is always accurate. Following the discussion in Blake and Kirsanova
(2008), I have not found evidence of multiple solutions. An implementation of this
algorithm is available in Debortoli et al. (2008).
A.3 First Order Conditions
The FOCs of each targeting regime are obtained by solving a problem similar to
(5), with the period loss function given by the delegated objectives. One can find
the maximum social welfare with the corresponding optimal ωM by evaluating each
targeting regime in a grid of points ωM .
In the following FOCs, Iq 6=0 denotes the indicator function with Iq 6=0 = 1 if q 6= 0,
and Iq 6=0 = 0 if q = 0. Variables with a superscript D, denote variables evaluated
under default. Variables with a superscript DC denote variables where in one period
Default occurs and in two periods Commitments are kept. An analogous convention
applies for variables with a superscript DD or CD. For convenience, superscripts C
and CC are omitted. The derivative of f at t + 1 w.r.t. g is written as ft+1,g. The
paper only considers bounded solutions, which necessarily satisfy the transversality
conditions.
A.3.1 Inflation Targeting
Et{−pit + β2(1− q)λDt+1(1− α)− λt + β2q(1− α)λt+1
+αλt−1Iq 6=0 + λtβα (1− q)piDt+1,pi} = 0 (A-1)
−ωITxt + λtκ = 0 (A-2)
−pit + κxt + β(1− α)pit−1 + βαqEtpit+1 + βα (1− q)EtpiDt+1 + ut = 0 (A-3)
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A.3.2 Speed Limit Policies
Et{−pit + β2(1− q)λDt+1(1− α)− λt + β2q(1− α)λt+1
+αλt−1Iq 6=0 + λtβα (1− q)piDt+1,pi} = 0 (A-4)
Et{−ωSLT (xt − xt−1) + βqωSLT (xt+1 − xt) + β(1− q)ωSLT (xDt+1 − xt)
+λtκ+ λtβα (1− q)piDt+1,x} = 0 (A-5)
−pit + κxt + β(1− α)pit−1 + βαqEtpit+1 + βα (1− q)EtpiDt+1 + ut = 0 (A-6)
A.3.3 Nominal Income Growth Targeting
Et{−ωNIGT (pit + yt − yt−1) + β2(1− q)λDt+1(1− α)− λt
+β2q(1− α)λt+1 + αλt−1Iq 6=0 + λtβα (1− q)piDt+1,pi} = 0 (A-7)
Et{−ωxt − ωNIGT (pit + yt − yt−1) + βqωNIGT (pit+1 + yt+1 − yt)
+β(1− q)ωNIGT (piDt+1 + yDt+1 − yt) + λtκ+ λtβα (1− q)piDt+1,y} = 0 (A-8)
−pit + κxt + β(1− α)pit−1 + βαqEtpit+1 + βα (1− q)piDt+1 + ut = 0 (A-9)
A.3.4 Price Level Targeting
Et{−pt + β (1− q)V t+1pt + β2q (1− q) (−λCDt+2β (1− α))
−λt[1 + βqα− βα (1− q) (pDt+1,pt − 1)] + αλt−1Iq 6=0
−λt+1βq[−1− β (1− α)− βα (1− q) pCDt+2,pt ]− λt+2 (βq)2 β (1− α)} = 0 (A-10)
−ωPTxt + λtκ = 0 (A-11)
−pt + pt−1 + kxt + β (1− α) (pt−1 − pt−2)
+βqαEt (pt+1 − pt) + βα (1− q) (EtpDt+1 − pt) + ut = 0 (A-12)
Et{−V t+1pt + β (1− q) (−λDDt+2β (1− α))
−λDt+1[−1− β (1− α)− βα (1− q) pDDt+2,pt ]− λDCt+2β2q (1− α)} = 0 (A-13)
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